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Surveillance on the Internet: A Comparison of the United States and European 
Approaches to Protection of Privacy on the Internet in the Face of Increased Government 
Monitoring in an Effort to Combat Domestic Terrorism 
I. Hypothetical 
 Concerned with the ever present threat of terrorism and the growing influence of ISIS, the 
Federal Government has begun to monitor domestic accessing of websites containing ISIS based 
content.  The Government’s surveillance program begins by compiling a list of “target websites” 
based on the site’s ISIS related content.  The Government tracks who accesses these websites by 
identifying each IP address of every person that visits a “target site.”  The Government will then 
create a database compiling all of the IP addresses of the individuals who access these sites.  The 
Government will then run searches within the database to identify individuals who have been 
frequently visiting these “target sites.”  If an IP address is identified as frequently visiting the 
“target sites,” they will be deemed a “high volume” user.  Once an IP address is deemed “high 
volume,” the Government will then target that individual for further monitoring.  This further 
surveillance will involve the Government obtaining the personal information for the user of each 
“high volume” IP address, as well as continually monitoring all of the IP addresses that individual 
accesses.  The Government will conduct this surveillance without warrants. 
A suit is brought by an individual who was identified as a high volume user and became 
aware that all of his internet browsing was being monitored.  This individual is claiming that the 
government violated his Fourth Amendment privacy rights by obtaining his IP address through the 
“target website” monitoring and subsequently monitoring his “outgoing” IP addresses.  
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An IP address is a number that marks a “location” on the internet.  Every website on the 
internet has only one IP address.  So, for example, even a website as expansive as Google has one 
unique IP address that every person visiting that website connects to.  Additionally, each individual 
who accesses the internet has a unique IP address that is assigned to them. 
II. The Right to Privacy in the United States 
a. Brief History of the Development of the Right to Privacy through the Fourth 
Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: “The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.”1   
The United States Constitution, unlike many foreign country’s constitutions, does not 
contain an explicit “right to privacy.”   While not explicitly included, the Supreme Court has found 
there to be a right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment.2  The Fourth Amendment protects 
individual’s “privacy” by not allowing for their private property be to be unreasonably searched 
or seized without a warrant.   
Fourth Amendment privacy protection has evolved over time to allow for protection from 
different kinds of government invasions.  In its early stages, privacy protection was limited to 
stopping the Government from physically encroaching on an individual’s property.3  However, 
                                                          
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2 See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
3 See Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
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with the advent of new technologies, the Court has recognized that there can be an invasion of 
privacy through Government conduct that does not involve physical intrusion.4  The move away 
from requiring physical intrusion for there to be a Fourth Amendment violation recognized that 
communication itself was private and should be protected.5  While Katz was a case dealing with 
communication through the phone, Fourth Amendment protection has continued to evolve to 
protect new technologies by applying the reasoning laid out in Katz. 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches of private property by the 
Government, unless the Government has obtained a warrant to do so.  Therefore, in order to prove 
a Fourth Amendment violation, an individual would first need to show that there was a “search” 
by the Government.  If they can show that there was a search and the Government did not have a 
warrant for that search, the burden would shift to the Government to show that their search was 
valid despite not having a warrant. 
In our hypothetical, an individual argues that the Government conducted a Fourth 
Amendment “search” when they obtained his IP address.  Therefore, our analysis begins with 
consideration of whether government conduct of this nature is considered a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
In order to show that there was a Fourth Amendment search, it first must be shown that the 
Government accessed something that was protected by the Fourth Amendment.  Under modern 
Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine, there are two ways by which a defendant can achieve this: 
(1) showing that the government encroached on something he had a “reasonable expectation of 
                                                          
4 See Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
5 Id.   
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privacy” or (2) that the government “physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information.”6     
Since there was no physical occupation here, in order to prove that there was a search 
Defendant would need to meet the requirements of Katz.7  In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice 
Harlan laid out a two-part test for analyzing whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.8  This test contains a subjective and objective prong, first requiring that the individual 
subjectively believed that he had a right to privacy and second that that expectation of privacy was 
one that society accepts as reasonable.9   
Analysis of whether there was a “reasonable expectation of privacy test” will frequently 
involve employing the third-party doctrine as stated in Smith v. Maryland.10  Under the third-party 
doctrine, information loses its Fourth Amendment protection once it is voluntarily shared with a 
third-party.11    However, recognizing the potential for a complete erosion of Fourth Amendment 
protection as a result of the third-party doctrine, the Supreme Court in Smith limited their holding 
based on whether the information was “content of communication.”12  Even if disclosed to a third-
party, any information that is deemed to be “contents of communication” will retain its Fourth 
                                                          
6 See Katz, 389 U.S. 347, see also United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
7 In Jones, the Court applied the physical intrusion test to GPS tracking of an individual’s car by 
the Government.  Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 953.  While the GPS signals were sent electronically, the 
police physically placed the GPS device on his car, making it a physical intrusion on his private 
property.  Ibid.  The Jones Court discussed the future application of the two tests, stating that 
when the surveillance only involves the transmission of electronic signals, then the Katz test still 
applies.  Ibid. 
8 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
9 Ibid. 
10 442 U.S. 735 (1979).   
11 Id. at 743-44. 
12 U.S. v. DiTomasso, No. 14-cr-160 (SAS), 2014 WL 5462467 at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 
2014)(citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 741). 
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Amendment protection.13  On the other hand, if the information is deemed to be “the ancillary 
information that the act of communication incidentally discloses,” then the information loses its 
Fourth Amendment protection once it is disclosed to a third-party.14  Today, the distinction 
between “content” and “non-content” is also frequently described as the difference between “data” 
and “metadata.”15 
Since its holding was announced, Smith has served as the starting point for evaluation as 
to whether information is “content” and thus still protected despite third-party disclosure.  Courts 
have attempted to analogize modern technologies and surveillance methods with the factual 
situation in Smith to reach this decision.16  
In Smith, the government, without a warrant, caused the telephone company to install a 
“pen register” at its offices to record the numbers dialed on the home phone of the defendant.17  
The government used the phone numbers dialed by the defendant to confirm their suspicion that 
he was the one making phone calls associated with a crime.18  This dialing information was used 
to obtain a warrant to search Defendant’s home, who was later convicted.19  The Court in Smith 
rejected the defendant’s argument that there was a Fourth Amendment violation, based on the 
conclusion that the installation of the pen register did not constitute a “search.”20  In reaching this 
holding, the Court concluded that the phone numbers dialed were not “contents” of the phone call 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 DiTamasso 2014 WL 5462467 at *3. 
16 See e.g., U.S. v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509 (9th Cir. 2007); American Civil Liberties Union 
v. Clapper, 959 F.Supp.2d 724, 749-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
17 Smith 442 U.S. at 737. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Id. at 737-38. 
20 Id. at 745-46.   
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that was made, so there was no protection due to the disclosure of the dialed numbers to the phone 
company.21   
The holding in Smith says that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for “non-
content” that is disclosed to a third-party.22  The rationale behind this holding is that the objective 
prong of the Katz test is not met because it is no longer reasonable to expect that the information 
will remain private because you cannot control what that third-party will do with the information.23   
The importance of the determination of whether something is “contents” under the third-
party doctrine cannot be overstated.  Once something is “not protected” by the Fourth Amendment, 
it can be freely obtained by the Government without a warrant.  If the information is not protected, 
then there is no “search” in obtaining it and the burden will not shift to the Government to have to 
argue that a warrant was not necessary. 
b. Development of the Right to Privacy with Respect to Modern Technology 
 1. Standard that Has Been Applied 
 With respect to modern technology, as long as there is no physical intrusion by the 
Government, courts continue to apply the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test to 
determine whether the information obtained by the Government is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.24  Additionally, Smith has been applied to almost every surveillance case involving 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See e.g., U.S. v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573-74 (3rd Cir. 2010), Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509.   
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information from internet or cell phone use, as all such communication is relayed through a third-
party, whether it be an internet service provider (“ISP”) or cell service provider.25 
 2. The Internet and the “Content” vs. “Non-Content” Distinction 
In our hypothetical, the Government compiled the IP addresses of every person who visited 
a “target site.”  Since the internet use was conveyed through an ISP, the third-party doctrine of 
Smith would have to be considered.  This leaves the question or whether an IP address is “content” 
under Smith.  Courts that have addressed this issue have concluded an IP address is not content. 
As discussed above, IP addresses can be used to identify both the individual who is using 
the internet as well as the websites which that user visits.  Courts have discussed IP addresses in 
both contexts.  In Christie, the court monitored a particular website to see what IP addresses were 
“incoming,” ultimately using the IP address to find out personal information on the individual who 
accessed the monitored site.26  In Forrester, on the other hand, the court was looking at “outgoing” 
IP addresses and thus monitoring the websites the individual was visiting.27    In both cases, the 
same conclusion was ultimately reached: individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
for their IP addresses, and therefore they are not protected under the Fourth Amendment.28   
In U.S. v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of a government 
surveillance program that, among other things, obtained the IP addresses of websites the defendant 
visited.29  The government had applied for and received court permission to install a “mirror port” 
                                                          
25 See e.g., Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509-511, Clapper, 959 F.Supp.2d 724, 749-52. 
26 Christie, 624 F.3d at 573-74. 
27 Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510. 
28 Christie 624 F.3d at 574; Forrester 512 F.3d at 510.   
29 Forrester 512 F.3d at 509. 
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at the ISP connection facility.30  The “mirror port” recorded the internet activity of the defendant 
and allowed the government to learn the “to and from” of his email communications, the IP 
addresses of the websites he visited, and the total volume of information sent to or from his 
account.31     
 The court ultimately rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the surveillance 
because they concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment “search.”32  The court applied the 
third-party doctrine and determined that the “mirror port” was not “content” as it was analogous 
to the pen register in Smith.33  The court reached this conclusion by determining that an IP address 
is voluntarily conveyed to the ISP and that an IP address does not contain any more information 
about the contents of communication than phone numbers dialed.34  While the court recognized 
that the nature of the communication could potentially be deduced based on the website name, 
they concluded that this does not distinguish the case from Smith because that could also be done 
with phone numbers dialed.35   
In Christie, the Third Circuit determined that there was no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment when the government recorded defendant’s IP address and subsequently used the IP 
address to get the defendant’s personal information.36  Here, the defendant was convicted of crimes 
related to his involvement in the distribution of a child pornography through a website.37  The 
government began monitoring the website and obtained the IP addresses of those who accessed 
                                                          
30 Id. at 505. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Id. at 509. 
33 Id. at 510.   
34 Ibid.   
35 Ibid.   
36 Christie 624 F.3d at 574. 
37 Id. at 562.   
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it.38  Once the IP addresses were identified, the government brought the IP address information to 
the ISP to obtain the personal details of the individual who the IP address was assigned to.39  The 
defendant in this case was one of the individuals who was identified through this process.40  The 
court applied the third-party doctrine and concluded that the defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his IP address, and therefore the government’s conduct did not constitute 
a “search.”41   
The distinction between “content” and “non-content” information has also applied to 
similar situations involving statutory, as opposed to Fourth Amendment, violations.  Despite 
applying different law, courts have reached the same general conclusion, IP addresses are not 
“content” of internet communication.   
In addressing such a statutory claim, The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts analyzed what constituted “content” with respect to obtaining IP addresses of 
websites recorded through a pen register.42  The requirements for obtaining a “pen register” were 
laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).43  Included in these requirements is that the pen register cannot 
record the “contents of communication.”44  The court also applied 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), which 
defines “contents” to “include[] any information concerning the substance, purport or meaning of 
that communication.45   
                                                          
38 Id. at 563.   
39 Ibid.   
40 Ibid.   
41 Id. at 573-74. 
42 In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing use of A Pen Register and Trap, 
396 F.Supp.2d 45, 48 (D.Mass.2005). 
43 Id. at 47.   
44 Ibid.   
45 Id. at 48.   
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Under the pen register sought by the government, the ISP would be required to provide 
them with the incoming and outgoing IP addresses of the particular account which is subject to the 
pen register.46  The court held that the IP address of websites visited, on its own, did not contain 
“contents of communication.”47  
However, the court went on to identify closely related information that would could be 
obtained through the pen register that would cross the line into being “content.”48  Specifically, 
the court discussed a potential issue if the user entered search terms, and those search terms 
appeared in a URL recorded by the pen register.4950  In applying the statutory definition of 
“content” to this type of URL, the court stated that “the ‘substance’ and ‘meaning’ of the 
communication is that user is conducting a search for information on a particular topic.”51  In so 
holding, the court drew a distinction between search terms and a website name, concluding that 
while an IP address is not protected, search terms crossed the line into being “contents” and thus 
are protected by the Fourth Amendment.52   
The approach of In re Application has been discussed in the Fourth Amendment context in 
Forrester.53  There, the court discussed how a URL might be different from an IP address because 
it identifies the specific page on a website that the individual viewed.54  Also, the footnote 
                                                          
46 Ibid   
47 Ibid.   
48 Id. at 48-49.   
49 Id. at 49. 
50 A URL identities the specific page within a website, as opposed to the IP address, which 
captures only the name of the website.  As discussed by the court, in certain situations a URL 
also has the potential to contain search terms entered by a user. 
51 Id. at 49.   
52 Id. at 50. 
53 512 F.3d at n.6.   
54 Ibid.   
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addresses how certain URLs containing the search terms that the user inputted immediately before 
accessing the website would contain “contents.”55  Thus, the concept of information similar to IP 
addresses being contents has been explored in the Fourth Amendment context as well. 
Regardless of whether it is an “incoming” or “outgoing” IP address, or whether it is in the 
context of a statutory or constitutional claim, IP addresses have not been considered “content of 
communication.”  Despite this consensus view thus far on IP addresses, courts have continued to 
move in the direct of considering more information closely related to IP addresses to be content.  
As discussed, infra, other factors are also pulling in the direction of constitutional protection for 
IP addresses.    
 3. Other Modern Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment 
Though dealing with a different technology, the recent district court decisions addressing 
the bulk telephony metadata collection program (“telephony program”) could impact future 
analysis of internet usage surveillance. 
 In Klayman, the court rejected the application of Smith to the telephony program in granting 
a preliminary injunction to stop the collection based on a potential Fourth Amendment violation.56  
Since there was no physical intrusion, the court applied the Katz “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test.57 
 The court determined that it is very likely that the plaintiffs had a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” with respect to the specific metadata collection program at hand in this case.  The court 
                                                          
55 Ibid.   
56 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). 
57 Id. at 30. 
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reaches this conclusion by not apply Smith.58  The court ultimately concludes that the factual 
scenario here is so substantially different from that in Smith that it does not apply.59   
The Court went to great lengths to distinguish the factual situations in Smith from the one 
at hand.  The Court discussed how the Smith Court could not have predicted how phones would 
be used today when they contemplated their decision.60  Further, they discussed how the pen 
register in Smith was short-term and very fixed in nature, while the collection here is expansive 
and long-term.61  The Court also noted the difference in the relationship the Government had with 
the phone company, with today’s situation being an ongoing almost contractual situation as 
opposed to a one time collection of information.62  Finally, the court reasoned that the most 
important distinguishing factor was that the “nature and quantity of the information contained in 
people’s telephony metadata is much greater” in the telephony program than what was collected 
in Smith.63  The court discussed how due of the pervasiveness of cell phones in our lives, the 
metadata, while the same type of information as in Smith, allows the Government to glean much 
more information about a person from the metadata today than they did in 1979.64   
Having rejected the application of Smith, the court determined whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy without consideration of the third-party doctrine.  In doing so, the court 
accepts plaintiffs’ statement that they subjectively expected privacy.65  The court the concluded 
                                                          
58 Id. at 37.   
59 Ibid. 
60 Id. at 31.   
61 Id. at 32.   
62 Id. a 32-33.   
63 Id. 33-34.   
64 Id. 35-36.   
65 Id. at 37. 
13 
 
that the expectation was objectively reasonably.66  However, in doing so, the court makes clear 
that its decision is not that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy to all metadata, 
just that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy against the particular surveillance method 
used by the government in the telephone program.67   
 In Clapper, the Southern District of New York reached the opposite conclusion with 
respect to the same telephony program.68  This opposite holding was reached because the Clapper 
court determined that Smith was applicable to analysis of the telephony program.69   
 The Clapper court discusses how the metadata here is not different in any significant way 
from the metadata at hand in Smith.70  The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the information 
in the current case allows for a rich mosaic to be created, because it would require multiple steps 
by the government outside of the telephony program to create such a picture.71 
 Finally, the court considered the current landscape of related decisions, first making clear 
that the Supreme Court has not overruled Smith.72  The court then addressed the Klayman decision, 
stating their belief that the court in that case addressed hypothetical issues down the road and 
mistakenly focused on the expansion of the use of the telephone.73  The Clapper court 
acknowledges that there is a changing technological landscape, but states that the facts at hand 
only concerns the telephone as it is used in the traditional sense.74  Ultimately, the court concludes 
                                                          
66 Ibid.   
67 Ibid. 
68 Clapper, 959 F.Supp.2d 724.   
69 Id. at 750-51. 
70 Id. at 750.   
71 Id. at 750-52. 
72 Id. at 752.   
73 Ibid.   
74 Ibid.   
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that since Smith controls, the NSA’s metadata collection program does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.75 
 4. Other Approaches that Courts have Considered 
Recently, however, the court has begun to question to applicability of Smith in the face of 
changing technologies and societal trends.  
The applicability of Smith to modern technologies was questioned in a case in front of the 
United States Supreme Court in the concurrence in U.S. v. Jones.76  This case dealt with the 
installation of a GPS tracking device on a car by the government, and was ultimately deemed to 
be a search based on the physical trespass that occurred when the device was installed. Despite 
agree with the application of the physical intrusion test to the case at hand, in a concurring opinion, 
Justice Sotomayor questioned the third-party doctrine’s merit with respect to modern technologies.   
In her concurrence, Sotomayor addresses the potential harms that could come from 
allowing extensive governmental surveillance.77  Namely, she identifies that “awareness that the 
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”78  Further, she 
recognizes that “the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects 
of identity is susceptible to abuse” and may alter the relationship between government and 
citizens.79  Along with this, she notes that there are potential issues that could arise from allowing 
extensive executive power in this area without oversight from another branch.80   
                                                          
75 Ibid. 
76 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor J., concurring). 
77 Id. at 956.   
78 Ibid.   
79 Ibid.   
80 Ibid. 
15 
 
 Sotomayor goes on to discuss how it might be time to reconsider the third-party doctrine 
in light of changes in both technology and how society interacts with technology.81  She discusses 
how people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third-parties in carrying out 
mundane tasks based on the nature of current technologies.82  Sotomayor further states that she 
would “doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure of every Web 
site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.”83  Finally, she discusses how secrecy 
should no longer be a prerequisite for privacy.84  She argues that just because something is 
disclosed to some member of the public for a specific purpose, it should not for that reason alone, 
lose its Fourth Amendment Protection.85  However, since the case was resolved based on the 
physical intrusion, Sotomayor ultimately concluded that this is an issue that must be decided 
another day.86 
 In DiTomasso, the court determined that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of his email and chat room communications despite agreeing to terms of 
service with the websites that they would monitor his activity.87  The court reached this conclusion 
by determining that the defendant’s recognition that he would be monitored by the service 
providers did not mean that he consented to being searched by the Government.88  The court 
                                                          
81 Id. at 957. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 DiTomasso, 2014 WL 5462467 at *5-6.   
88 Ibid. 
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applied the reasoning from Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones, in reaching the conclusion 
that the third-party doctrine was inapplicable to the case at hand.89 
c. How the “Reasonableness” of an Unwarranted Search is Evaluated 
 A warrantless search is per se unreasonable.90  However, a warrantless search will be valid 
if it falls under one of the court recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.91  As was the 
case in Klayman, discussed infra, the exception that could apply to the search in our hypothetical 
is the “special needs” exception.  
 The special needs exception involves a balancing test, weighing the individual’s privacy 
right against the government interest at stake.  However, the preliminary question that needs to be 
asked when applying the special needs doctrine is, whether the search serves a purpose 
independent of normal law enforcement needs.92  Since the search in this case is aimed at 
protecting against terrorist attacks, this threshold question would be easily satisfied.  
 A court will apply a three part balancing test to determine whether the warrantless search 
is justified and therefore valid under the special needs exception.93  The three factors are: (1) the 
nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by the search; (2) the character of the 
intrusion impose by the government; and (3) the nature and immediacy of the government’s 
concerns and the efficacy of the search in meeting them.94   
                                                          
89 Id. at *6.   
90 City of Ontario, Cal. V. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010). 
91 Ibid. 
92 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).   
93 Klayman, 957 F.Supp.2d at 38 (quoting Bd. of Educ. V. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-34 (2002). 
94 Ibid. 
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 In Klayman, the court analyzed whether the government’s warrantless bulk metadata 
collection program would be deemed valid as a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.95  
The court applied the “special needs” doctrine based on the conclusion that this suspicionless 
search could only be justified if there was a government need beyond normal law enforcement.96  
Thus, the court applied the three part balancing test, to determine whether the warrantless search 
was valid due to a “special need.”97 
 The court in Klayman quickly addressed the first two factors, concluding that the plaintiffs 
have a significant expectation of privacy and that the bulk metadata collection program 
significantly intruded on that expectation.98  The court then addressed the third factor, and 
concluded that the government interest was to increase the speed of investigating terrorism as 
opposed to generally protecting against terrorism.99  The court went on to state that the program 
was not effective in increasing the speed of investigations, citing the lack of evidence of the bulk 
metadata collection having stopped or aided in stopping any imminent terrorist attacks.100  Based 
on this reasoning, the court concluded that the plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of showing 
that their privacy interests outweigh the government interests in collecting and analyzing the 
metadata in question.101   
 
 
                                                          
95 Klayman, 957 F.Supp.2d at 37-38. 
96 Id. at 38. 
97 Id. at 38-42. 
98 Id. at 39.   
99 Id. at 39-40.   
100 Id. at 40-41.   
101 Id. at 41. 
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III. European Approach to the Right to Privacy on the Internet 
The right to privacy is explicitly stated in Article Seven of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (“Charter”).  Article Seven provides that “Everyone has the right to 
respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.”102  Additionally, under 
Article Eight, the Charter provides “protection of personal data:”   
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes 
and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or 
some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has 
the right of access to data which has been collected 
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by 
an independent authority.103 
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) recently ruled on a case that dealt with a 
mandate that service providers retain data that would be accessed by the government.104  The court 
applied a proportionality test in determining that the legislation authorizing the data retention was 
invalid as it was not limited to what was strictly necessary to achieve the government’s purpose.105 
 The legislation at hand mandated that service providers retain certain user information 
related to both telephone and internet communications, including the IP addresses of users.106  The 
legislation made clear that the substance of communications were not to be retained.107   
                                                          
102 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 7. 
103 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 8. 
104 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. V. Ireland, C-293/12 (Eur. Ct. H. R. April 8, 2014). 
105 Id. at ¶ 69. 
106 Id. at ¶ 26. 
107 Ibid. 
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 The ECHR concluded that this data, among other things, made it possible to know the 
identity of the user and who the user was communicating with.108  The ECHR determined that the 
data as a whole might allow precise conclusions about the individual to be drawn, including habits 
of daily life, activities carried out, and social relationships they are involved in.109    
The ECHR then discussed how fundamental rights of individuals are harmed by this 
retention program.110  Specifically, the ECHR focused on Articles Seven and Eight of the 
Charter.111  The ECHR discusses how it does not matter if the information is sensitive or whether 
the person conceived of the information as being protected, all that matters is there was an 
interference with these rights by retaining this data and providing it to the government.112  
The ECHR then discussed whether there was a “general interests” that this legislation 
achieved.113  The ECHR discussed how the material object of the legislation was to contribute to 
the fight against serious crime, including terrorism, and the ultimate goal was to enhance public 
security.114  The ECHR concluded that this was a “general interest.”115   
Since there was both an infringement of a fundamental right and a general interest, the 
ECHR applied a proportionality test.116  Under this test, the legislation must not “exceed the limits 
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of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve [its] objectives.”117  Essentially, the 
legislation may only infringe on individual rights where it is “strictly necessary.”118   
The ECHR found that the legislation was not limited to what was strictly necessary to 
achieve the general interest so it was invalid.  Specifically the ECHR was concerned with the broad 
application of the surveillance and the failure of the legislation to focus the data gathering towards 
the prevention of crime.119  Despite the governmental interest in prevention of terrorism, the ECHR 
was unwilling to uphold the wide-sweeping surveillance legislation under proportionality review 
since the legislation “entail[ed] a wide-ranging and particularly serious” interference with the 
individual’s protected rights in their privacy and data.120   
 
IV. Future of Right to Privacy on the Internet in Light of Concerns of Terrorism 
 a. How Should the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Standard be Applied in 
Future Cases? 
Despite recent questioning of its long term sustainability, the third-party doctrine 
announced in Smith is the current standard of the United States Supreme Court.  While under the 
current landscape a court will almost certainly find that an individual does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to their IP address, there are strong policy reasons to change to a standard 
that protects this information. 
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 The concurring opinion of Justice Sotomayor in Jones provides a forward thinking 
perspective on the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections.  Sotomayor focuses on 
the changes that have occurred in the dynamic between society and technology.  
 Today, the internet use is so extensive that it occupies a major role in both work and social 
lives of a significant portion of Americans.  The internet has become the dominant and at times 
exclusive means of communication, research, socialization, and expression for many Americans.  
Additionally, some content, including much of the information on ISIS, is only available through 
the internet. 
 One major problem with the continued growth of internet use in society today is that 
individual privacy is being sacrificed along the way.  Unless a highly skilled individual goes to 
great lengths to avoid using one, accessing the internet is only possible by using an ISP.  While 
this does not present a problem in terms of using the internet, this reality has major implications 
on the ability of the Government to monitor internet use. 
Since all internet access is achieved through an ISP, all communications on the internet is 
necessarily conveyed through a third-party.  Therefore, all communication on the internet is subject 
to analysis under Smith.  As discussed above in Forrester and Christie, under this analysis, courts 
have exclusively held that IP addresses are not “content,” and thus not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.  Therefore, any government surveillance that involves obtaining IP addresses is not 
a “search” and thus never requires a warrant.  This conclusion by the courts places the privacy of 
internet users at great risk. 
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 There are two primary reasons why the court reaches this conclusion.  First, court continue 
to apply the Smith doctrine, despite it being inapplicable to the technologies of today.  Along with 
this, courts fail to recognize that IP addresses are “content of communications.” 
 The Smith doctrine is inapplicable to the technology of today because it fails to account for 
the inescapable requirement to relay communication through a third-party.  This reality calls into 
question one of the basic premises of Smith, that disclosures to the third-party are voluntary.  It 
cannot be argued that a person voluntarily chooses to send information to their ISP when accessing 
the internet.  However, the voluntariness can be called into question because of the lack of 
alternatives to the third-party disclosure.  As discussed in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in 
Jones, forcing individuals to choose between, accessing the internet while being monitored and 
not accessing the internet at all, chills expressive freedoms.  Third-party disclosure on the internet 
is not truly voluntary.  Similar to the discussion in DiTomasso, the recognition by individuals that 
they have to disclose information to their ISP should not mean that they are agreeing to disclose 
their information to the government.  As the pervasiveness of the internet in our lives continues to 
grow, the “voluntariness” of the third-party becomes more questionable.  Since voluntariness was 
a focus of the Smith holding, it is time for the Court to reconsider the application of the third-party 
doctrine to the internet and related technologies. 
 However, if the Smith doctrine continues to be applied to the internet, IP addresses should 
be considered “content of communications” and thus receive Fourth Amendment protection based 
on the vast amount of information that can be gleaned from monitoring them.  Under current 
analysis, IP addresses have been analogized with phone numbers that are dialed on a phone.  This 
comparison fail to take into account the expansive picture that can be painted by compiling the IP 
addresses an individual accesses.  As was recognized by the European Court of Human Rights, 
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tracking an IP address can result in the acquiring of a detailed picture of an individual’s life.  While 
the European approach was supported by provisions in their Charter protecting the right to privacy 
and the right to protection of personal data, the Fourth Amendment must be the source of privacy 
protection in America.  Therefore, courts should abandon the narrow interpretation of what IP 
addresses contain, and adopt the reasoning of the ECHR. 
The conclusions of the ECHR recognize the resulting picture that can be drawn from 
analysis of large amounts of IP addresses or other metadata in today’s world.  While an IP address 
will not show the details of the website or the exact links that are followed while the individual is 
on the website, there is a great deal that can be revealed in the name of the website itself.  Though 
some IP addresses will not reveal any information on the user, such as www.google.com, there are 
others that could be very telling and thus allow the government access into private matters.  For 
instance, an individual who is dealing with alcohol abuse might visit websites such as 
www.quitalcohol.com or www.alcoholrehab.com.  Clearly, obtaining these IP addresses would 
allow the government to know that this individual has an interest in alcohol recovery.  The same 
result could occur with IP addresses related to any number of private issues, such as sexual 
orientation, gender identity, religious beliefs, and abortions. 
 An argument has been made that this information can also be gleaned from the phone 
numbers that are dialed, as was the case in Smith.  For instance, the government could glean the 
same alcohol abuse information if an individual that was being monitored dialed the phone number 
of an alcohol rehabilitation facility.  While this is true to some extent, the main difference between 
the pen registers in Smith and the monitoring today is scale, both in terms of individual use and 
government surveillance.  
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By determining that IP addresses are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, the courts 
allow unchecked government surveillance of all internet activity.  This approach fails to recognize 
the privacy interests that are at stake by leaving unprotected the vast amount of information that 
can be gleaned from IP addresses. 
The Court should adopt an approach that more appropriately addresses whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, which can be achieved by not focusing on whether the 
information was disclosed to a third-party.  A shift in focus away from disclosure to a third-party 
will eliminate the content vs. non-content distinction.  Instead, the court should return to the basic 
principles of Katz and evaluate whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy considering 
both the subjective and objective prongs.  While this will involve more balancing of objectiveness 
by individual courts, it is better than operating under the continued assumption that there is no 
expectation of privacy as a result of disclosure to an internet service provider.   
 
 b. If There is a “Search,” How will the Reasonableness of that Search be Evaluated 
in Light of the Government Interest In Preventing Terrorism? 
If it was determined that there was a “search” in the monitoring of our hypothetical, the 
next step would be to analyze whether the search is valid despite being warrantless.  As discussed 
above, the most likely means of finding the warrantless search valid is under the “special needs” 
exception. 
Analysis under the special needs exception involves a three factor balancing test:  (1) the 
nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by the search; (2) the character of the 
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intrusion impose by the government; and (3) the nature and immediacy of the government’s 
concerns and the efficacy of the search in meeting them. 
Considering the first factor, the privacy interest at stake is significant.  The interest at stake 
here is very similar to that of Klayman.  This is not a case where the environment of the search 
makes it so there is a diminished expectation of privacy.  Instead, examples of when there has been 
found to be a diminished expectation of privacy under the special needs exception include searches 
while is on public transportation and while entering into private property such as sports stadiums.  
While it is clear that the first factor weighs in favor of the search being deemed unreasonable, the 
lack of diminished expectation of privacy is not determinative on its own. 
 Next, the court will look to the character of the intrusion of the privacy right.  As was the 
case in Klayman, if it is deemed to be a “search,” the surveillance at issue would be quite an 
invasive search.  The protected content of the individual’s IP address would be fully obtained by 
the government every time one of the monitored sites is accessed.  A further inquiry into the IP 
address would lead to personal information being obtained, and further surveillance of the IP 
address would lead to extensive information being obtained about the individual’s life. 
 The major factor weighing in favor of the special needs doctrine applying to the search is 
that the government interest is protecting against terrorism.  There is no doubt that everyone will 
agree that terrorist prevention is of the highest priority among government interests.   
In light of Klayman, in which the court framed the government’s goal in the telephony 
program quite narrowly as only being aimed at increasing the speed of investigating terrorism, the 
primary question would be what the government interest is in the hypothetical.  While much of the 
Klayman reasoning is sound and forward thinking, its framing of the government interest is 
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extremely narrow.  It seems likely that future courts to address this issue will move towards a 
broader reading of the government purpose.  With this belief in mind, it seems that the government 
interest in the hypothetical would be identification of potential terrorist threats. 
While this government interest in mind, the court would have to analyze whether the 
program was efficient in achieving this goal.  In Klayman, the court looked to the failure of the 
telephony program to assist in the prevention of any imminent terrorist attacks.  A similar analysis 
would likely occur in our hypothetical. 
Having considered the factors individually, the court would then have to weigh all three 
factors against each other in a balancing test.  Based on the above discussion, the court will likely 
be left with a weighing of a full-fledged privacy interest of the individual against a Government 
interest in preventing terrorism.  
When a similar analysis was done by the ECHR under proportionality review, they reached 
the conclusion the legislation did not adhere to the requirement of encroaching on individual rights 
only when it is “strictly necessary” to do so.  Under this approach, it seems likely that the 
hypothetical program would fail as the European statute did.  However, it is less clear whether 
such a result would follow under the special needs balancing test, which applies a less restrictive 
standard to government intrusion on individual’s privacy rights.  
V. Conclusion 
 The current privacy protection for internet content in America fails to account for the 
realities of modern technology and government surveillance abilities.  In order to better protect the 
privacy on individuals who access the internet, the American approach should follow the lead of 
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Europe and begin to protect the spectrum of personal information contained in internet browsing 
data. 
 
